Abstract-The United Kingdom has twice suffered major disruptions as a result of fuel panics, first in September 2000, coincident with a wave of fuel protests, and, more recently, in March 2012, following political warnings of a possible future supply chain disruption. In each case, the disruption and economic consequences were serious. In this paper, we demonstrate that agent-based techniques offer a powerful framework for simulation of supply chains and consumers under conditions of transient demand. In the case of fuel panic crisis, we show that even a highly abstract model can reproduce a range of transient phenomena seen in the real world and present a set of practical recommendations for policymakers faced with panic buying.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N THIS paper, we argue that the methodology of agentbased simulation can provide a unified framework for modeling vehicle fuel distribution and supply and the social and spatial dynamics that give rise to transient demand. Taking as our example the U.K. panic buying of petrol as occurred in September 2000 and March 2012, we show that even a highly abstract model can reproduce a range of transient phenomena seen in the real world; we use our model to develop insights into the causes of these phenomena and to evaluate the effectiveness of several proposed responses and offer a set of recommendations for policymakers faced with panic buying.
II. FUEL PANICS: THE U.K. EXPERIENCE
Over the first decade of the 21st century, the U.K. petroleum retailing sector experienced a process of consolidation, driven by strong competition and by the fixed per-site costs of compliance with environmental regulations. We focus on the position around 2010 as it falls between the two major crises and just before the more recent events. As of July 2010, there were approximately 9000 filling stations in the U.K. [1] . Supermarkets account for 1200 sites, or 14% of the total. Average annual throughput is 2.2 million L/year for a standalone site or 11 million L/year for a supermarket site. Filling stations are resupplied by road tankers from one of around 50 major depots, which, in turn, are resupplied from refineries by pipeline, rail, and sea. Tankers have a capacity of around 30 000 L; assuming dedicated deliveries, standalone sites must be resupplied, on average, once every five days and supermarket sites daily. Resupplying stations more frequently with partial tanker loads can reduce inventory requirements somewhat; Boctor et al. [2] described several techniques for solving the resulting trip packing problem.
Precise data on filling station tank capacity are hard to obtain, as the majority of standalone filling stations are owneroperated small businesses. Table I shows data for four stations, taken from planning applications and business-for-sale advertisements; assuming that these are representative, we obtain an estimated total capacity across the filling station network of 620 million L.
At the end of 2009, there were 34.3 million vehicles registered in the U.K. [3] . Assuming an average fuel tank capacity of 55 L, we obtain an estimated total capacity across all vehicles of 1.9 billion L, or roughly three times the capacity of the filling station network. Dividing this figure by the daily filling station throughput of 83 million L gives a mean time between refueling of 23 days.
To date, modeling of petroleum retailing has concentrated on accounting for the observed spatial and temporal variation in prices. Anderson [4] presented a model in which competitive dynamics combine with consumers' tendency to refuel early if offered an attractive price to produce short-period price oscillations. Heppenstall et al. [5] developed a family of agent-based simulations that model the geographical distribution of petrol prices, taking into account retailer strategies and consumer preferences.
A. September 2000
Periodic direct-action protests over the cost of fuel have been a feature of political discourse throughout Western Europe over the past two decades. The first significant example in the U.K. took place in September 2000, when a coalition of farmers and road hauliers blockaded refineries and depots across the British mainland in protest against the high price of diesel fuel brought about by the fuel duty escalator and competition from foreign hauliers. Robinson [6] provided a chronology of the protests, which may be summarized as follows. The economic impact of the protests was estimated at £1bn by the Institute of Directors [7] . Department for Transport statistics [8] indicate that motorway traffic had fallen to 39% below normal levels by September 14 and did not fully recover until the end of the month; we see from Fig. 1 that the recovery was not smooth, but instead exhibited marked oscillations.
On a political level, the protests were essentially successful, forcing the government to abandon the fuel duty escalator and to introduce cuts in duty on ultralow-sulfur petrol as part of the November 2000 prebudget report.
Of particular interest is the role of panic buying in depleting fuel reserves. Based on the figures in Table I , and assuming that car and station fuel tanks were at random levels at the start of the protests, we might expect it to have taken five days from the cessation of supply for 50% of standalone filling stations to close; in reality, 90% of filling stations were closed within two days. The high ratio of aggregate vehicle tank to station tank capacity allowed opportunistic early refueling to overwhelm the system, creating a situation in which the remaining fuel was concentrated in the tanks of "lucky" drivers, whereas their unlucky counterparts were forced off the road. It is the opinion of the authors that attempts to discourage panic buying were hindered by the following three key factors:
• the lack of a preexisting organized system for enforcing rationing; • retailers' reluctance to increase prices, for fear of being accused of gouging; • the well-documented low price elasticity of demand for fuel [9] .
B. March 2012
On March 25, 2012, British media, including the Guardian newspaper, reported that the Minister for the Cabinet Office, Francis Maude MP, had recently called on the tanker drivers' union Unite to seek an agreement in an industrial dispute in which a ballot for strike action was being planned [10] . All parties, including the Minister, were acutely aware of the experiences of September 2000, and reports claimed that the Minister had remarked that the government had "learned the lessons of the past" [10] . Given what was to follow, it appears they had not. Over the following days, public anxiety grew, and demand rose at filling stations. After two days, on March 27, the first filling stations started to run out; by the following day, there was full-scale fuel panic [11] .
On Wednesday, March 28, Francis Maude appeared on Sky News and offered advice that was later to be criticized for being dangerous. He said: "When it makes sense, a bit of extra fuel in a jerry can in the garage is a sensible precaution to take" [12] . Despite having no strike action, nor any other disruption to the supply chain, the mere fear of disruption fanned by political statements had been sufficient to prompt a serious wave of panic buying across the whole country.
One key difference from September 2000 relates to the ubiquity of Internet communications and, hence, better opportunities to understand unfolding events. As a consequence of technological improvements over the intervening 12 years, bottom-up approaches to data gathering were now possible, which, when combined with data visualization tools, allowed the panic to be assessed almost as it unfolded. An example using Google Fusion tables was developed by staff at the Guardian [11] . This example was developed for public consumption, in some sense closing the circle to those that provided the original data.
The fact that the March 2012 crisis did not have its origins in a real supply chain problem is interesting, particularly when considering the closing phase of the crisis. While reassuring messages continued to be issued from the government, it seems probable that the real end to the crisis was simply a consequence of the end of an initial crisis-building phase in which fuel had shifted from underground storage at filling stations to the tanks of concerned motorists. At the beginning of the crisis, one might assume that the average driver has a part-full tank, e.g., somewhere around 40% full. By the beginning of the end of the crisis, however, the average driver has a nearly full tank, e.g., 85% full. At that point, demand from consumers falls away as absorptive capacity is diminished. If during the crisis the supply chain sources fuel at a steady rate, then the closing phase of the crisis will emerge as supplies to petrol station forecourts start to exceed demand, and during that period, stocks in filling station storage tanks will be replenished. The very closing phase of the crisis can be expected to be a need for the supply chain to reduce output to filling stations owing to an eroding absorptive capacity downstream (at this point of both filling stations and vehicles). It should be noted that the major Easter public holiday in England and Wales fell over the long weekend April 6-9, 2012, and by that point, the crisis was largely over. Whether the holiday itself contributed to the easing of difficulties is not easily verified, but it would appear to be only a minor issue against what is otherwise an extremely pure example of a fuel crisis panic.
III. AGENT-BASED SIMULATION
We suggest that a complex problem of this type is better suited to agent-based approaches than to more analytical methods aiming for closed-form mathematical solutions. The model presented here is capable of simulating the central aspects of a fuel crisis and is capable of illustrating the processes in informative ways. Agent-based simulation is a technique for modeling complex systems through the interaction of a population of autonomous software objects. Individual agents interact with their environment and each other, typically following a simple behavioral schema, which can be represented by a finite-state automaton. Models of physical systems often embed agents in a multidimensional space, with interagent connectivity or partially determined by proximity.
It should be emphasized that the primary value of agentbased simulation is in illuminating the dynamics of a realworld system in a controlled environment amenable to experimentation, rather than in predicting the system's exact future behavior.
In the field of behavioral science, Ajzen's theory of planned behavior [13] aims to explain an individual's behavior in specific contexts in terms of three interrelated factors, as follows:
• attitude: whether the individual is well disposed toward engaging in the behavior; • subjective social norms: the perceived degree of social pressure to engage in the behavior; • perceived behavioral control: the anticipated ease of engaging in the behavior. These factors serve as the antecedents of intention, a term that represents the degree of effort the individual is prepared to expend to engage in the behavior. Whether the behavior takes place then depends on both intention and perceived behavioral control. The latter directly contributes because, holding intention constant, an individual who believes that the intended behavior is achievable is more likely to successfully engage in it and because perceived control serves as a good proxy for actual control, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for action. The sensitivity of each source of intention to external factors is determined by endogenous parameters, which correspond to the individual's personality traits or beliefs.
The theory of planned behavior provides the modeler with a framework for incorporating additional noneconomic factors into an agent's schema. These factors may prevent an agent from engaging in an otherwise economically favorable activity if it violates a perceived norm or is seen as being too difficult to accomplish or vice versa. In Zhang and Nuttall's simulations of technology adoption, individual attitude is determined by economics, whereas subjective social norms and perceived behavioral control are influenced by input from the agent's social network and the actions of regulators [14] . The favorability of each possible action is determined by a weighted sum of these inputs, and at each time step, the agent takes the most favorable action.
1) Physical Model:
The 1-D world of our model comprises N × M cells arranged in a ring; for convenience, each cell is assigned an index x, starting from zero. There are N petrol stations, with tank capacity S, regularly spaced around the ring, in cells i × M + M/2 for i in the range [0, N − 1]; M is chosen to be odd, so that every cell has a unique closest station. Every agent has a home cell, which serves as an anchor point for its movement during the simulation and determines the agent's neighbors in the social network overlay. Each cell is home to D agents; the total agent population is therefore D × N × M . Each agent has a fuel tank of fixed capacity c uniformly chosen within the range [C 0 , C 1 ] and two randomly chosen destinations d 0 and d 1 within R cells of its home. At the start of the simulation, the agent is moved to d 0 and proceeds toward d 1 at a rate of one cell per unit time, consuming one unit of fuel for each cell traversed. Under normal conditions, when it arrives at one destination, it begins to travel toward the other; if the agent has insufficient remaining fuel to reach the new destination and then to drive to the nearest station, it first drives to the nearest station. On arrival at the station, if there is sufficient fuel, the agent will refill its tank and proceed to the new destination; otherwise, it will search adjacent stations in clockwise or counterclockwise order until it finds one with sufficient fuel, or it has less than M units of fuel remaining, in which case, it will join a queue. The preferred direction of search is randomly chosen at the start of each search for each agent and is then maintained until fuel is found. Fig. 3 illustrates the unpanicked motion of a typical agent back and forth between d 0 and d 1 (middle row), with occasional trips to d 0 's nearest filling station (bottom row) or d 1 's nearest filling station (top row) when its fuel supply is nearly exhausted; for simplicity, we have omitted the possibility that there is insufficient fuel at the filling station.
Agents do not refuel opportunistically when passing stations, reflecting the finding by Kurani et al. [15] that the majority of drivers strongly dislike refueling their vehicles. To simulate rationing, the model uses functions U (t) and V (t), indicating the maximum and minimum amounts of fuel that an agent is permitted to take from a filling station at a given time, respectively. In the event that V (t) is nonzero, an agent will not proceed to a filling station unless it can guarantee to accept that much fuel.
Stations are resupplied from a central depot, which, for simplicity, acts as an infinite-capacity source of fuel. Fuel arrives in tankers with capacity T , and there is a fixed latency of L units of time between a request for fuel and the arrival of the corresponding tanker. Stations do not attempt to forecast demand and will not submit a request unless they can guarantee to accept T units of fuel; further requests will be emitted as long as the following holds:
where f is the current level of fuel, e is the total fuel requirement of all cars enqueued at the station, and i is the number of outstanding requests that have yet to be fulfilled. Although the trucks are not explicitly modeled as agents in the simulation, the depot implements a scheduling policy to restrict the number of trucks in transit at any given time to a maximum of I, assuming that a truck takes 2L units of time to complete a delivery.
Our model has periodic spatial boundary conditions; thus, no special action is required for agents near the edge of the world. The temporal boundary condition requires more care; introducing the entire population of agents into the simulation at t = 0 will result in a large spike in demand as agents refuel nearsimultaneously around t = C. Each agent's behavior is deterministic and, in the absence of petrol shortages, will repeat with period p ≤ 2C. 1 We therefore introduce each agent at a time t 0 , randomly distributed in the range [0, p); this eliminates spurious demand correlation, bringing the simulation into a steady state by t = 3C, after which it is allowed to run until t = K.
2) Social Network Overlay: To support the flow of information between agents, we construct a scale-free social network overlay. The agents are sorted in order of home cell, and each is connected to the X preceding and X succeeding agents; agents at the beginning of the list are connected to those at the end of the list and vice versa. Each connection is then rewired to a randomly selected agent with probability 0 ≤ B ≤ 1, avoiding loops and duplicate connections. Fig. 4 shows the formation of the social network for the N = 3, M = 3, X = 2, B = 0.2 case; in the graph on the right, 7 of the 36 edges in the original ring lattice have been rewired to random locations.
3) Psychological Model: The key decision facing each agent in our model is whether to engage in panic buying. A panicking agent will attempt a refueling trip every time it arrives at a destination, rather than waiting until its tank is nearly empty. We utilize a simple stateful psychological model based on Ajzen's theory of planned behavior to capture this reasoning process. Each agent has a Boolean state variable p ∈ {True, False}, which is True if the agent is currently panicking or False otherwise. At each time step, the agent has an opportunity to communicate its state to each of its peers in the social network overlay. Communication between any two peers is a random process, occurring with probability P in each time step if the transmitting agent is panicking or with probability Q if it is not; by setting P = Q, we can model biased communication, in which agents are more likely to communicate one state than the other. An agent chooses to update its state based on direct observation of whether there is a queue at a filling station in the current location and on communication received from its peers.
The three antecedents of action in the theory of planned behavior are attitude, subjective social norms, and perceived behavioral control. For the sake of simplicity, we omit the last of these; while more sophisticated simulation might attempt to model an agent's changing beliefs about whether panicking will accomplish anything, we have been able to obtain useful results without incorporating this level of detail. Each agent maintains a list of the Y most recent communications it has received or observations it has made. If this list contains more negative entries than positive ones, then the agent is predisposed to panic. While an individual's subjective norm relating to panic buying is by and large socially determined, it may still be expected to vary widely within society, and to remain fixed over the timescale of our simulation. We model an agent's subjective norm by a threshold 1 ≤ z ≤ Y ; then, a predisposed agent will panic (i.e., set p to True) if and only if its queue contains at least z pieces of negative information. In principle, at the outset, each agent could be assigned a personal threshold z. In the work presented here, the threshold was set to 1 for all agents.
4) Graphing and Reporting:
Our simulation provides a range of reporting options, allowing us to examine both aggregate data (fill level of station tanks, fraction of agents queuing and panicking, number of trucks in use) and local data (proportion of agents with a given home panicking). The former can be depicted using conventional graphs, with the various elements on the y-axis plotted against time on the x-axis. To depict the latter, we use a system of 2-D heat maps, with distance around the ring on the y-axis and time on the x-axis; each pixel in the map is assigned a color from an iron bow thermography palette, with black indicating no agents at that location panicking and white indicating all agents panicking. In some cases, the heat maps reveal the spatial dynamics of panic, with waves of panic moving through the simulated community (see Section III-C3). This observation would benefit from follow-on research. For some of our simulations, we provide an aggregate measure of the impact of a disturbance in terms of the number of car time units (CTUs) or thousands of car time units (kCTUs) spent queuing. One car queuing for 1000 time units or 1000 cars queuing for one time unit are judged to have equal impact.
A. Implementation
Our operational model was coded from first principles in the Python programming language (a summary of the model parameters is shown in Table II ). The choice over the use of existing software packages was made for reasons of simulation speed and a desire to easily permit others to use our model and to test our conclusions. Our model and further background explanation are available from the Electricity Policy Research Group at the University of Cambridge, U.K.
B. Experimental Results
Many of the simulations presented here are variations on a "baseline scenario," which has 4500 cars and 10 filling stations on a 90-unit ring. The model parameters for the baseline scenario are shown in Table III ; these are chosen to permit rapid simulation and to maintain a broadly realistic ratio between aggregate station and car tank capacities. Note the baseline case of Y = 1 (with z = 1) corresponds to discarding all but the most recent observations or communications. Changes to the baseline are described in each section below.
1) Panic Buying Can Create Oscillations Through Demand Coherence:
There is some evidence, as presented in Fig. 1 , of oscillatory behavior in the aftermath of the September 2000 fuel protests. To examine the susceptibility of our model to oscillations, we begin with our baseline scenario and apply an exogenous shock to the system by forcing every agent into the panicked state for 300 units of time starting at t = 500. The resulting trace is shown in Fig. 5 . It is noteworthy that no fuel supply difficulties are required for panic to spread, as was seen in March 2012. We see that the inventory of fuel rapidly drops with the onset of panic at t = 500, as agents switch from their normal pattern of infrequent large purchases to a "topping off" behavior. The number of trucks in the system increases, with the result that inventory returns to its equilibrium level by around t = 700. After the external forcing into panic ends at t = 800, we observe that inventory undergoes two very pronounced oscillations and remains highly variable for the rest of the simulation. It is notable that during the trough of the first oscillation, nearly 30% of agents are queuing for fuel, many more than at any point during the original disturbance. To understand why these oscillations occur, it is helpful to examine the fraction of agents refueling in each time step, both immediately before and around the trailing edge of the period of panic, as shown in Fig. 6 .
As we would expect, when the system is in the equilibrium state before the onset of panic, a little over 1% of agents refuel in each time step; cars have 100-unit fuel tanks, and due to the constraints of the physical model, they must generally refuel shortly before their tank becomes empty. Toward the end of the period of panic, the system has reached another equilibrium state, with nearly 10% of agents refueling in each time step; with agents refueling, on average, every 11 time units, it follows that the average tank is around 95% full. When the panic ends, there is a brief period during which agents complete refueling trips begun during the panic, followed by a period in which no refueling takes place, as all agents have sufficient fuel. After t = 850, the refueling rate rapidly increases, peaking at 4.7% at t = 900, as many agents run low on fuel simultaneously; this Fig. 6 . Agents refueling in each time step before and after panic (C 0 = 100, C 1 = 100). Note that refueling is distinct from queuing, requiring just one time step. coherent demand drains the fuel inventory completely and is responsible for the subsequent oscillations in the supply chain.
There are two obvious objections to the applicability of this result to the real world. The first is that occurrences of panic seldom have crisp edges, with the population moving in unison from the nonpanicking state to the panicking one or vice versa; we will see in subsequent sections that oscillations still occur when panic is allowed to organically spread through the social network overlay, rather than being imposed from outside. The second is that real cars have different capacity fuel tanks and are driven different amounts each day; is it possible that oscillations are purely a by-product of the uniform tank size and consumption rate of our agents? To address this concern, we repeat the previous simulation with fuel tank sizes randomly distributed in the range [50, 150] . Fig. 7 shows the resulting trace.
We see that oscillations still occur; while they are less pronounced than in the previous case, the peak number of cars queuing during the first trough is still higher than at any point during the original disturbance. Demand is much less coherent, but the refueling rate still rises to 50% above the equilibrium rate at t = 920. 
2) Adding Delivery Capacity Can Promote Oscillation:
A common reaction to the appearance of shortages in a supply chain is to draw on reserve delivery capacity; e.g., at the conclusion of the September 2000 fuel protests, military and spare commercial tankers were used to boost deliveries to 135% of normal levels for a period of several days, with the aim of rapidly restocking depleted filling stations [6] .
In its equilibrium state, our baseline model requires between 220 and 225 fuel trucks to be in circulation at any given time. To understand the possible effects of accelerated restocking behavior, we run the model twice, once with an unconstrained supply of trucks and once with the number of trucks in circulation constrained to be fewer than 230. In each case, we apply an exogenous panic to every agent beginning at t = 500 for 100 units of time. The resulting maps are shown in Fig. 8 .
In the unconstrained case, the number of trucks rapidly climbs to a peak of 292 as agents throughout the system panic, and filling stations run short of fuel. This increase in supply brings the initial shortage to an end within 100 units of time; because all agents are now able to top off, demand becomes highly coherent, resulting in a larger shortage when many agents refuel (at around t = 700). In the constrained case, the initial shortage lasts longer, but the secondary shortage is less intense due to reduced coherence; both effects can be clearly seen from the maps. The overall impact of the disturbance is 9.2 kCTUs with the constraint, versus 25.9 kCTUs without; 22.8 kCTUs (88%) of the impact in the unconstrained case occurs during the second shortage. We conclude that adding delivery capacity under shortage conditions can cause damage by increasing demand coherence; the very intervention practiced at the end of the September 2000 fuel protests may have directly contributed to the observed oscillations in the fuel supply.
As in the previous section, it is reasonable to ask whether the observed benefit of restricting the number of trucks is merely a by-product of the uniform tank size and consumption rate of our agents. To address this concern, we repeat the pair of simulations several times, with fuel tank sizes randomly distributed in the range [100 − a, 100 + a] for a in the range [0, 55]. Fig. 9 shows the increase in impact due to removing the constraint, plotted against 2a (the width of the tank size distribution).
We see that, even for a comparatively broad spread of tank sizes, there is a substantial benefit to constraining the number of trucks in circulation; at no point does imposing the constraint lead to an increase in impact.
3) Unbiased Communication Can Inhibit Panic: Supply chains often experience small-scale disruptions, brought about by random variations in demand or by the failure of a localized element of the distribution system. During the first few days of the September 2000 fuel protests, for example, blockades were sporadic, and regular deliveries continued in most parts of the country; that there was not in any real sense a nationwide crisis encouraged the government to adopt a "business as usual" response to the protests. In these circumstances, communication between individuals might have the effect of spreading panic buying like a contagion, with consumers inside the affected areas infecting those outside; alternatively, it might reassure those inside that the shortages are a local phenomenon, thereby inhibiting panic.
We say that communication is unbiased if it has an equal chance of propagating good or bad news between a pair of agents; in the context of our model, this requires us to select equal values for the parameters P and Q. To quantify the impact of unbiased communication, we run the baseline model twice, once with P = Q = 0, denoting "no communication," and once with P = Q = 0.1, denoting "unbiased communication"; in each case, we simulate a local failure at t = 500 by postponing deliveries to one filling station by 15 units of time. The resulting maps are shown in Fig. 10 . From the maps, we see that unbiased communication results in low-intensity panic rapidly spreading throughout the system, without ever reaching the level required to trigger a collapse in the supply chain. Without communication, panic initially remains localized in the vicinity of the disturbance, eventually reaching a level where adjacent filling stations are drained of fuel; the resulting disturbance propagates throughout the system and persists for some hundreds of time units. The overall impact of the disturbance is 514 CTUs for unbiased communication, versus 10.2 kCTUs for no communication. We conclude that unbiased communication between agents can act to inhibit panic in our model.
This ability to both model and visualize the spatial and temporal evolution of demand is a key advantage of agent-based simulation. Fig. 11 shows that in the "no communication" case, panic levels at two points on opposite sides of the ring are approximately in antiphase; this level of detail is difficult to obtain using other modeling methodologies.
4) Even Slightly Biased Communication Can Promote Panic:
Although we believe that unbiased communication between individuals can inhibit panic, real-world communication is seldom unbiased. Patterson [16] characterized the tendency of media organizations to focus on negative information as a "bad news bias," citing several examples from the U.S. political arena. Based on a study of the relative popularity of online New York Times articles, Berger and Milkman [17] reported that individuals are more likely to pass on "content that evokes . . . negative (anger or anxiety) emotions characterized by high arousal." To illustrate the impact of bad news bias in our model, we begin with the "unbiased communication" configuration described above and progressively reduce the parameter Q, representing the likelihood of propagating the calm (no-panic) state, while holding P constant. As before, we simulate a local failure at t = 500 by postponing deliveries. Fig. 12 shows maps for progressively larger biases, whereas Fig. 13 shows the variation in impact with bias.
A bias equal to 1% of the total propagation probability produces a significant increase both in impact and in the incidence of panic, relative to the unbiased case. At a bias of 10%, impact rises to 4.7 kCTUs, after which it remains roughly constant. A bias of 15% is sufficient to establish self-sustaining panic within the population of agents; this occurs despite there being no queuing and, therefore, no external justification for panic, after t = 800. In this last case, an individual agent's positive observations of its environment are overwhelmed by negative information from its peers; this is an example of the "information cascade" phenomenon described by Bikhchandani et al. [18] .
5) Censorship Is an Effective Antidote to Biased Communication:
In times of crisis, governments might be tempted to attempt to control the dissemination of information. Our purpose here is not to consider the legality or morality of any such step but rather merely to examine its potential effectiveness. The degree of an agent describes the number of other agents to which it is connected in the social network overlay. Fig. 14 shows the degree distribution for our baseline model. The few high-degree agents act as hubs, distributing information between geographically distant regions; we can model the impact of censorship on the incidence of panic by disrupting the flow of information through these agents.
Taking our baseline model with P = 0.1 and Q = 0.085 (a bias of 15%), we rank the agents by degree, randomly permuting the agents that have the same degree, and censor the highest ranked agents. If an agent has a lot of connections, it is an influential high-ranked agent. We pick the n most influential agents and censor any bad news coming from them. That is, if they try to transmit the news that they saw a queue, we silently destroy the message before it arrives at the recipient, while still allowing good news to propagate. In our first set of experiments, we force each censored agent into the no-panic state at each time step; this corresponds to the "hard" censorship case, in which individuals are induced to actively distribute inaccurate positive information. In our second set, we disable propagation of the panic state from the censored agents; this corresponds to the "soft" censorship case, in which individuals merely avoid distributing negative information. Fig. 15 shows the variation in impact with the proportion of agents censored for each case.
Impact follows a sigmoid curve, reaching a minimum of around 100 CTUs once 10% of agents have been censored in the hard case or 15% in the soft case. While little benefit is gained for small interventions, both forms of censorship are effective remedies in the case of biased communication, with hard outperforming soft for moderate-sized interventions.
6) Enforceable Maximum or Minimum Ration Can Inhibit Panic:
A common response to a shortage is to introduce a system of rationing. Where a shortage is expected to persist for an extended period or is predictable in advance, it is possible to establish a formal system for limiting individual consumption; an example would be the use of ration books in the U.K. during the Second World War. During the September 2000 fuel protests, an ad hoc system developed [6] : drivers were limited to a certain maximum ration of fuel on each visit to a filling station, with the intent of reducing overall consumption. A maximum ration has the advantage of being easy to implement (by limiting the amount dispensed by each pump), but the disadvantage is the intent is hard to enforce (as drivers can continue to visit filling stations until their tank is full).
To investigate the impact of a maximum ration on our model, we can modify the function U (t), restricting the maximum amount of fuel that an agent can extract from a filling station on each visit. We run the baseline model twice (see Fig. 16 ), each time with a 10% communication bias (P = 0.1, Q = 0.09) and a simulated local failure at t = 500: we use the following values for U (t):
Introducing rationing at t = 600 immediately halts the decline in fuel inventories and the rise in the number of panicking agents. By t = 900, both metrics have returned to their equilibrium levels. The impact of the shortage is 410 CTUs, as compared with 2.2 kCTUs in the unrationed case. An alternative approach is the minimum ration, under which cars are prohibited from refueling unless they can accept a certain minimum amount of fuel; the intention here is to reduce transient demand by preventing panicking consumers from topping off their tanks. In comparison with the maximum ration, the intent of this approach is more easily enforceable (once a driver has refueled, they must consume at least the ration before visiting another filling station), but the approach itself is less easily implementable (an attendant must inspect each vehicle prior to fueling). It has been suggested that it is sufficient to force customers to pay for a minimum ration; we reject this on the grounds that the short-run price elasticity of demand for petrol is low (see Dahl and Sterner [9] ) and is likely to decline further under crisis conditions.
To investigate the impact of a minimum ration on our model, we can modify the function V (t), controling the smallest amount of space that an agent can have in its tank when it refuels (see Fig. 17 ). We repeat the previous experiment, setting U (t) = C 0 and choosing V (t) as follows:
V (t) = 0 "no ration" case V (t) = 0, t<600 "ration" case = C 0 /2 otherwise.
Again, the introduction of rationing immediately halts the decline in fuel inventories and the rise in the number of panicking agents. The system takes slightly longer to return to equilibrium than before, and impact is slightly higher, at 500 CTU.
It is instructive to compare how the two modes of rationing affect a reduction in demand. Fig. 18 shows demand decomposed into average purchase size and number of purchases. We see clearly that, after t = 500, panicking agents begin to refuel more often, increasing the purchase rate and decreasing the average purchase size. In the maximum ration case, the reduction in demand after t = 600 results from a further rapid drop in average purchase size, as large purchases are completely eliminated. In the minimum ration case, it results from a rapid drop in the number of purchases, as cars with insufficient free tank capacity are eliminated from the pool of potential customers. Governments may wish to put in place infrastructure to improve the enforceability of a maximum ration or the implementability of a minimum ration in advance.
We conclude that both forms of rationing are similarly effective in inhibiting panic. Choosing between the two requires a judgment about their respective implementability and enforceability.
C. Final Remarks
There is evidence that natural bias in communication between individuals can give rise to baseless panic and that the disruption of communication through high-degree nodes in the social graph is disproportionately effective in limiting its spread. Nonetheless, we stop short of endorsing either "hard" or "soft" censorship as a policy response to the panic buying of petrol; we do so on ethical grounds and on the practical basis that, if detected, an attempt at covert censorship is likely to trigger even more widespread panic.
We repeat the caveat that our recommendations depend on their applicability on the assumption that our design model is a reasonable abstraction of the underlying domain model. In applying them, governments should be alert for indications that the macroscale behavior of the real system is diverging from the path suggested by our simulations.
